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Secrecy Laws from Switzerland to
the Caribbean and Beyond
I. INTRODUCTION
Developments of modern technology have transformed a once
divided world into a single economic community. Individuals and
corporations no longer confine their activity to a single country. Like-
wise, criminal enterprises have gone international, availing themselves
to the benefits existing in countries around the world.' Legitimate
and illegitimate actors alike often employ foreign banking systems to
conceal assets they would rather keep private. 2 The United States has
recognized the use of foreign banks by criminals and is constantly
improving methods to detect such activity.
3
One of the most effective ways United States prosecutors impair
1. "The current trend is to use the secrecy laws of tax haven countries to facilitate tax
evasion. For example during the period 1977 through August 1983, the [Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS")] identified 772 criminal cases which had financial transactions involving some
90 foreign countries.... The frequency of [IRS] cases involving foreign countries is increas-
ing." CRIME AND SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES, S. REP. No.
130, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 2 (1985) (quoting a letter dated April 19, 1984, from the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service to Senators William Roth and Sam Nunn)
[hereinafter REPORT ON OFFSHORE BANKS].
2. Parties using foreign banking systems include United States-based companies or indi-
viduals using banks other than those located in the United States, as well as foreign-based
companies and individuals using United States banks in their business operations. This Com-
ment will focus on illegitimate business activities that use foreign offshore banks.
3. JUDICIAL PROCEDURES IN LITIGATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, S. REP.
No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1964). "The steadily growing involvement of the United
States in international intercourse and the resulting increase in litigation with international
aspects have demonstrated the necessity for statutory improvements and other devices to facili-
tate the conduct of such litigation." Id. at 2. In 1982, the Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations initiated a study of criminal exploitation of foreign tax haven countries. That
subcommittee's report to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs stated that drug
traffickers and those involved in commodities fraud favored these havens because these coun-
tries exhibited an uncompromising attitude toward secrecy. REPORT ON OFFSHORE BANKS,
supra note 1, at 1.
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criminal activity is by tracing the illegal proceeds.4 However, this is a
difficult process in an international context. The prosecutor or inves-
tigating agency must discover which country the criminal has depos-
ited the illegal proceeds. Investigators frequently require assistance
from foreign governments to uncover this information. The United
States government has made a serious effort to establish these chan-
nels of cooperation. Professor Gerhard Mueller aptly described the
state of affairs existing in the early 1960s:
Absent treaty or statute, American courts, in general, have been
reluctant to cooperate with foreign criminal tribunals. The reason
may be found in traditional isolationism, ignorance of foreign
criminal law and procedure - which is often suspected of being
inquisitorial - or simple unfamiliarity with a court's own express
or implied powers to grant judicial assistance. 5
The desire to cripple organized crime and other unlawful activity
in the United States requires that law enforcement's reach extend as
far as the criminal may go. However, in this zealous pursuit, practical
and procedural limitations exist. The United States is concerned with
protecting the accused's legal and constitutional rights, granted by
both the United States and the country from which assistance is
sought. In the pursuit of evidence located abroad, the United States
balances these constitutional interests with the need for decisive
convictions.
This Comment examines the methods by which the United States
obtains criminal evidence from foreign banking institutions, through
the use of treaties of mutual assistance. 6 Cooperation with the gov-
ernment of a foreign country assures that the United States does not
infringe on the rights which that country accords those under its juris-
diction.7 This Comment examines bank laws in Switzerland, and ex-
amines the United States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
4. Ethan A. Nadelmann, Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad: U.S. Foreign Policy and
Financial Secrecy Jurisdictions, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 33, 34 (1986).
5. Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters, 7
VILL. L. REV. 193, 198 (1961-62).
6. The term "mutual assistance" as used in this Comment refers to reciprocal obliga-
tions and duties imposed by a treaty on the signatories.
7. Legislative bodies frequently design a country's secrecy laws for banking institutions.
Thus, clients of a bank, regardless of citizenship or residency, gain the protection of the law.
Elliot A. Stultz, Note, Swiss Bank Secrecy and the United States Efforts to Obtain Information
from Swiss Banks, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63, 67-68 (1988).
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Criminal Matters 8 ("Swiss Treaty") as a model treaty to be used in
the formation of future treaties. In an effort to learn from and im-
prove on this model treaty, this Comment analyzes its strengths and
limitations. Next, this Comment compares the Swiss Treaty with re-
cently ratified treaties between the United States and her Carribean
neighbors, and evaluates their merits. Finally, this Comment offers
proposals for the improvement of mutual assistance treaties and nego-
tiation methods.
II. SOURCES OF THE PROBLEM
A. Money Laundering
One goal of every criminal enterprise is to "get away clean."
Evading the authorities and preventing the uncovering of clues that
will lead to one's detection and apprehension are critical areas the
wrong-doer can control. Many criminals, aware of the methods by
which authorities track them down, use money laundering and bank
secrecy laws to further elude authorities. A problem faced by perpre-
trators of crimes of pecuniary gain is that the ill-gotten money or val-
uable commodities may be traced to the unlawful source. Ideally, a
criminal would like to spend the money or reinvest it without raising
suspicion as to its origin, hence the term "money laundering."9 A
criminal will pass money through various channels in an effort to ob-
scure the "paper trail" and thus cause the money withdrawn from this
process to appear to be derived from a legitimate activity.10
For example, tax evasion is a crime of pecuniary gain because
taxes not paid are the proceeds from the crime. Because the money
8. Treaty on the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, Switz.-U.S., 27
U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Treaty].
9. Preventing reinvestment of criminal proceeds often impedes the commission of subse-
quent crime. This is a primary reason United States law enforcement authorities target the
proceeds of prior crimes. Other rationales underlying the seizure of proceeds include the fol-
lowing: (1) it deters and punishes offenders; (2) it prevents the escalation of more sophisticated
types of crime since higher level criminals often only violate laws relating to the proceeds,
preferring to distance themsleves from baser activities; and (3) it can often be used to fund law
enforcement activity. Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 34.
10. A money laundering scheme can be as simple as depositing the ill-gotten funds in an
account protected by secrecy laws, and then withdrawing them from the same account. A
transfer through two accounts, which doubles the difficulty in tracing the money, is also com-
mon. To prevent these withdrawals from appearing tainted, frequently launderers will open a
second account in the name of a "dummy" consulting business, and claim the money in the
account constitutes fees for untraceable, non-tangible services. For a collection of illegal con-
cealment schemes, see Bernhard F. Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in
the United States, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 18, 43-51 (1978-79).
19931 693
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
clandestinely deposited in a foreign account is not necessarily "dirty"
money at the time of deposit, but only becomes dirty if it is not re-
ported as applicable law requires, tax evasion is different from money
laundering. The United States Congress enacted the Banking Secrecy
laws" in order to combat the evasion of United States tax laws. In
1981, an Internal Revenue Service report discussing United States
taxpayers' use of tax havens found "that between 1968 and 1978, in-
ternational deposits made ... in banks located in all important tax
haven areas increased from $5.3 billion to $88.7 billion."' 12 In 1987,
the Tax Division of the United States Department of Justice reported
that tax evasion by United States taxpayers, primarily through use of
offshore financial centers, nurtured an underground economy of as
much as $600 billion.
13
B. Banking Secrecy in Switzerland
Every laundering or tax evasion scheme requires an institution,
often a bank, to mask the identity of the interest holder or the origin
of the funds. 14 Usually masking is only possible if the institution is
obligated to maintain account secrecy. The secrecy protection Swit-
zerland provides derives from three distinct legal concepts. 15
First, the Swiss concept of the right to privacy includes not only
privacy in one's health and family life, but also extends to one's finan-
cial existence. 16 As a civil law jurisdiction, Switzerland also extends
financial privacy to business entities. Common law jurisdictions such
as the United States confine the right to privacy to the individual.17
11. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-59 (1989). Banking secrecy in the United States is an oxymoron
because the laws do not involve secrecy at all, but require disclosure of transactions within the
guidelines of the laws. Danforth Newcomb, United States Litigation and Foreign Bank Se-
crecy: The Origins of Conflict, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 47, 50-51 (1988).
12. REPORT ON OFFSHORE BANKS, supra note i, at 2. In 1983, tax evaders and other
criminals had an estimated $222 billion hidden from the IRS in offshore banks. Id. at 1.
Another Congressional report stated that in 1984 the Treasury Department estimated that tax
havens cost the United States billions of tax dollars each year. ADMISSIBILITY OF FOREIGN
BUSINESS RECORDS, H.R. REP. No. 907, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984).
13. International Tax Evasion/Tax Treaty Issues, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House of Representatives Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 273, at 274
(1987) (statement of Michael C. Durney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division,
United States Department of Justice).
14. See generally Gregory P. Crinion, Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Ha-
ven Countries, 20 INT'L LAW. 1209, 1210 (1986).
15. Meyer, supra note 10, at 24.
16. Stultz, supra note 7, at 67.
17. Id. at 67 n.23.
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Second, Swiss banks promote the goals of bank secrecy as an im-
plied contractual condition. Pointing to its rigid chartering require-
ments, licensing procedures and severe tax and interest charges,
Switzerland considers itself a financial center rather than a money ha-
ven.18 Swiss bankers take great pride in providing banking services;
so much so, it can be called the Swiss national product. They believe
a successful banker-client relationship is founded on confidentiality
since the banker is entrusted with the financial privacy the civil law
grants to the individual or business.19 In fact, Swiss law allows "a
bank customer to sue his bank [in tort for injuries] ... for its failure to
maintain bank secrecy."'2
0
Finally, the Swiss government has historically held that secrecy
was valuable and during the early years of World War II, it made
violation of bank secrecy law a criminal offense. 21 Nazi German
agents' attempts to acquire the assets of German Jews were a direct
attack on Switzerland's reputation as a financial center.22 To preserve
its international integrity, Switzerland thwarted Germany's intrusion
by passing Article 47 of the Banking Law, which subjects anyone who
divulges secrets obtained by virtue of one's capacity with a financial
institution to a prison term or monetary fine.23
Many people overestimate the extent to which these secrecy laws
provide anonymity to foreign bank customers. Numbered accounts
keep customer names from lower level bank employees such as clerks
and tellers, although the bank does record the name of the opening
party.24 Bank officials provide the same level of secrecy to named
accounts as they do to numbered accounts or to the documents that
reveal the customer behind the numbered account. 25
Switzerland remains a popular tax haven and laundering center
despite recent cooperation from both Swiss banks and the Swiss gov-
ernment in United States' investigations and prosecutions of Swiss
18. REPORT ON OFFSHORE BANKS, supra note 1, at 125.
19. Stultz, supra note 7, at 67-68.
20. Id. at 68-69; see also id. at 68 n.27.
21. Id. at 71. Meyer, supra note 10, at 26.
22. Stultz, supra note 7, at 71.
23. Meyer, supra note 10, at 26 (citing 47 BankG, reprinted in UNION BANK OF SWIT-
ZERLAND, FEDERAL LAW RELATING TO BANKS AND SAVINGS BANKS 21 (1972) (unofficial
translation of the Banking Law, published by UBS, Zurich, 1972)).
24. Meyer, supra note 10, at 28.
25. Id. In fact, to maintain their image as a respected financial center and to distance
themselves from other tax havens, Swiss banks are no longer issuing or advertising numbered
accounts. Id.
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bank customers. 26 Preference for Swiss banks over other tax havens
may be attributed to "Switzerland's political and economic stability,
its historical commitment to financial privacy, and the soundness of
the Swiss franc."' 27 Nonetheless, other countries around the world
have emerged as tax havens, offering comparable banking secrecy and
services. 28
C. Tax Havens Around the World
Many countries which have adopted rules of secrecy similar to
those of Switzerland have come to be known as tax havens. A tax
haven country is a country in which banks withhold information re-
garding their customers' accounts. This information includes the ori-
gin or owner of the funds, the amounts of money deposited in,
withdrawn from, or transferred through an account, and how often
such account transactions occur. 29 However the existence of secrecy
laws does not necessarily mean that the country is a tax haven. A
country earns the label "tax haven" after the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice compares the value of its exports against the amount of foreign
assets in its banks.30 If the ratio of foreign bank assets to exports is
high, the country may be considered a tax haven. For example, in
1982, Bermuda and Panama each held foreign assets more than 100
times greater in value than the products they exported. 31 The Cay-
man Islands' index is immeasurable because it has almost no
exports. 32
Because of new Swiss laws and investigative cooperation with
other countries, the Cayman Islands now surpasses Switzerland as the
world's preeminent tax haven. 33 Still, to those unfamiliar with laun-
dering strategies, Switzerland conjures images of banks and anony-
mous accounts while countries such as Anguilla, the Cayman Islands
26. See William R. Salisbury, Note, International Agreements The United States-Switzer-
land Investigation of Insider Trading Through Swiss Banks, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 437, 438
(1983).
27. Id. at 442-43.
28. Id. at 442. These countries include Panama, Liechtenstein, the Bahamas, Luxem-
bourg, Germany, Curaticao, Hong Kong, and Bermuda. Id. at 442 n.41.
29. Crinion, supra note 14, at 1210.
30. RICHARD A. GORDON, ESTIMATES OF LEVELS OF TAX HAVEN USE: A STUDY TO
QUANTIFY THE USE OF TAX HAVENS, TAX HAVEN STUDY GROUP 1 (1981).
31. Crinion, supra note 14, tbl. I.
32. Id.




and Montserrat invoke images of vacation paradise. Unfortunately,
many suspected criminals are using these and other tax havens to
cleanse illicit money.3 4 In fact, even the Swiss use Caribbean banks to
regain the advantage of secrecy their own government has taken from
them.35
To effectively reduce money laundering, the methods employed
by Switzerland must be applied to these other tax havens. The Swiss
Treaty, discussed infra, should serve as a template for future negotia-
tions with other tax haven nations whose banks provide secrecy for
their customers. 3
6
III. METHODS OF OBTAINING EVIDENCE FROM ABROAD
In the past, cooperating countries have used several methods in
order exchange information to curb the use of bank secrecy for dis-
honest purposes. Passive judicial assistance, active judicial assistance,
and the mutual assistance treaties have all responded to the problem
created by money laundering and bank secrecy laws.
A. Passive Judicial Assistance
Passive judicial assistance is the process by which a nation ob-
tains evidence located in a foreign country without the assistance of
that country's government. 37 Typically, a nation will acquire foreign
evidence by the same methods that are available within its own bor-
ders.38 Occasionally, domestic methods will conflict with foreign law
and may be prohibited. 39 Frequently employed methods of evidence
gathering include domestic-based inquiry, independent investigation,
consent, and subpoena.
Domestic-based inquiry supplies information about foreign activ-
ity before the activity occurs.40 The United States, for example, has
34. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (1984) (prose-
cution found evidence related to individuals under investigation in banks in the Bahamas and
the Cayman Islands); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (1985) (prosecution found records
related to individual under investigation in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands).
35. Finn & Pouschine, supra note 33, at 43.
36. Paul W. Johnson, Note, Judicial Assistance - Criminal Procedure - Treaty with
Switzerland Affects Banking Secrecy Law, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 349, 350 (1974); James H.
Bloem, Note, Criminal Law - Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the
United States and Switzerland, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 469, 479 (1974).
37. Mueller, supra note 5, at 199.
38. See id. at 199-200.
39. See id. at 211.
40. See generally Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 42-43.
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enacted laws that require banks to report certain transactions con-
cerning monetary instruments4 1 and impose criminal sanctions for
failing to comply with the reporting requirements.42
Investigators may also obtain foreign evidence by entering a for-
eign country and conducting investigations as they would at home.
However, many countries refuse to grant foreigners the authority to
compel testimony and demand evidence from its citizens. In fact,
Swiss law makes investigations by or for a foreign nation illegal with-
out prior governmental approval.43 Granting such authority is un-
likely in many cases because a country that allows another nation to
conduct an investigation within its borders usually monitors and re-
stricts the investigation procedures.
The consenting guardian is another source of information located
abroad. Rarely will a suspected offender knowingly relinquish in-
criminating evidence. Consensual access can be acquired, however,
from others who rightfully have access to the evidence and who fear
no punishment for any wrong-doing. For example, a bank officer may
be privy to evidence and may be able to supply investigators with in-
formation but only in situations where the law does not require or
imply confidentiality. 44 Therefore, in bank secrecy jurisdictions, the
United States government must obtain information from other
sources. Frequently, United States officials will rely on informants to
provide crucial information;45 sometimes these informants are bank
employees who have witnessed suspicious activity and feel a desire to
divulge the information.46 Law enforcement agencies are often will-
ing to assist the foreign investigation as well. 47 At a minimum, these
informants face tort liability for their disclosures in secrecy jurisdic-
tions. Often, however, no mechanism for suppressing the evidence
41. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1952-53 (1988) requires uninsured banks to keep financial records and
evidence of its operation and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313-16 (1991) requires banking institutions and
individuals to report transactions in monetary instruments over a certain amount (currently
$10,000).
42. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1954-57 (1988) establish penalties for failure to comply with the bank
record keeping requirements. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321-22 (1988) establish penalties for failure to
report transactions in excess of $10,000 in currency.
43. Lionel Frei & Stefan Trechsel, Origins and Applications of the United States-Switzer-
land Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 31 HARV. INTERNAT'L L.J. 77, 78
(1990).
44. Stultz, supra note 7, at 73.
45. See Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 44.
46. Id.




Finally, a nation seeking foreign evidence or testimony may re-
sort to a subpoena. The subpoena is a valuable tool to the investigator
because it reaches as far as the jurisdiction of the issuing court
reaches. If a United States court determines a person to be sufficiently
present or doing business in its jurisdiction, 49 the court may compel
that person to produce documents and evidence within his control.50
In 1948, the United States Congress enlarged the federal courts'
authority to include within their subpoena power the ability to require
United States citizens or residents in foreign countries to produce doc-
uments and other evidence located abroad. The courts may also re-
quire persons within the United States to produce evidence within
their control but abroad. 5' Congress also gave the federal courts au-
thority to hold in contempt those who failed to comply with the
subpoena. 52
Since enactment of the foreign subpoena power, district courts
have compelled production of evidence without which the govern-
ment could not have prosecuted many cases. In 1983, in In re Grand
Jury Supboena Directed to Marc Rich & Co. ,53 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that a Swiss
corporation doing business in the United States must comply with a
subpoena for documents located in its foreign offices.54 The court also
found that the imposition of a per diem civil contempt fine of $50,000
pending compliance with the subpoena was within the court's discre-
tion and reasonable. 55 The following year, in In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings Bank of Nova Scotia,5 6 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed a Florida district court's ruling that required the
bank's United States branch office to produce documents from its
Caribbean Island branch offices. 57 By the time the bank completely
48. See, e.g., text accompanying note 20.
49. See generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1988). In 1987, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the lower court decision by finding that a witness in the Iran-Contra Affair
failed to produce business documents of eight foreign companies for which the witness acted as
a custodian. In re Sealed Case, No. 87-5256, 832 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1784 (1988).
53. 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 670.
56. 740 F.2d 817 (llth Cir. 1984).
57. Id.
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complied with the subpoena, its $25,000 per day fine totaled
$1,825,000.58
While the federal courts received the evidence they requested, the
courts forced defendant corporation Marc Rich to forfeit its secrecy
privilege available under Swiss law.59 Furthermore, by complying
with the federal court order, the Bank of Nova Scotia actually vio-
lated Cayman Island law. 63 Forcing transgression of a foreign coun-
try's law in order to comply with United States law is comparable to
invading the country and conducting an investigation using foreign
judicial mechanisms to circumvent that nation's law. In In re Grand
Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, the United States government
served its subpoena on March 4, 1983.61 The bank began its United
States appeal process in April 1983, after the Cayman branch office
denied its request for documents.62 In May 1983, the bank asked the
Grand Court of the Cayman Islands for permission to release the re-
quested documents but it refused with impunity.6 3 On November 11,
1983, the Cayman court denied a renewed request to circumvent the
secrecy law. 64 Six days later, however, the Governor of the Islands
exempted the bank from the law for the purpose of complying with
the subpoena. 65 The documents requested from the Bahamas branch
office were exempt from Bahamian law on November 11, 1983, as
well, but delays attributable to the bank postponed their admission
into evidence until February 14, 1984.66 To decide whether the sub-
poena wrongly infringed on a foreign secrecy law, the district court
employed a balancing test. The court concluded that the United
States' interest in investigating individuals involved in drug traffiking
outweighed the Cayman Islands' interest in preserving secrecy, a
characteristic crucial to the country's financial expansion.67
The court emphasized that there were exceptions to the secrecy
58. Id. at 824.
59. In re Mark Rich & Co., 707 F.2d at 665.
60. In re Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 826-27.
61. Id. at 820.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 821. The Attorney General of the Bahamas, however, did authorize disclosure
of records sought from a Bahamian branch. The United States appeal process halted the per
diem fine which the lower court had ordered due to the bank's refusal to hand over the Cay-
man documents. The bulk of the fine, therefore, came from the bank's refusal to provide the
Bahamian documents. Id. at 821 n.5.
65. In re Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 821.
66. Id. at 821-23.
67. Id. at 827.
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policy and that the accounts belonged to United States citizens who
expect less privacy because their government demands the disclosure
of such transactions. 6 The court concluded: "[tihe Bank has volunta-
rily elected to do business in numerous foreign countries and has ac-
cepted the incidental risk of occasional inconsistent governmental
actions. It cannot expect to avail itself of the benefits of doing busi-
ness here without accepting the concomitant obligations."' 69
Problems of inconsistency, such as those imposed on Nova Scotia
Bank by the governments of the United States and the Cayman Is-
lands, suggest mutual agreement would put both countries, and indi-
viduals in foreign countries, on notice as to what activity is susceptible
to invasion by another country.
B. Active Judicial Assistance
The most obvious way a country may gain access to information
in a foreign country is to have that country's officers investigate the
matter.70 Active judicial assistance, however, may be restricted by the
foreign country's laws and unwillingness to perform the requested ac-
tivities. The two primary forms of request are the letter rogatory and
the mutual agreement.
In the early nineteenth century, United States courts recognized
and used the letter rogatory as a device for obtaining information lo-
cated outside its jurisdiction. 71 However, a request that a foreign sov-
ereignty perform a specified task depends on the foreign sovereign's
sense of obligation to cooperate. "[A requesting nation] may ask for
whatever evidence or testimony it wants, however, there is no assur-
ance that [the requested nation] will oblige."' 72 Refusals to comply
with requests are often based on a conflict in law between the na-
tions,73 but a sovereign nation needs no grounds for refusing
assistance.
In 1964, the United States Congress authorized the Department
of State to serve as the liaison between tribunals of the United States
68. Id. at 827-28.
69. Id. at 828.
70. Gerhard Mueller considers this international coordination as a request "by the judi-
cial authorities of one nation, for the taking of active measures in the requested nation, in aid
of proceedings pending in the requesting nation .... beyond the mere taking of depositions or
the subpoenaing of documents or tangible evidence." Mueller, supra note 5, at 209.
71. Newcomb, supra note 11, at 60 n.83.
72. Lee Paikin, Problems of Obtaining Evidence in Foreign Statesfor Use in Federal Crim-
inal Prosecutions, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 233, 254 (1984).
73. Id. at 255.
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and foreign tribunals for the exchange of letters rogatory.74 The law
does not limit letters rogatory from the State Department; courts of
the United States and foreign countries remain free to exchange re-
quests75 as they have done in the past.76
The effectiveness of letters rogatory depends on comity between
nations. Matters the requesting state finds important, however, are
often less pressing to the requested nation. In United States v. Bas-
tanipour,77 the district court issued its judgment after postponing the
trial several months while anticipating a response to a letter roga-
tory.78 The court decided to proceed to judgment and allow a new
trial if the requested evidence materialized and justified a new trial.79
Letters rogatory may be refused if the requested nation feels the
release of the information would be contrary to its own interests.80 In
Re Westinghouse Electric Corp. and Duquesne Light Co. ,81 the
Supreme Court of Canada refused to disclose information to the
United States it felt harmed the interests of the Canadian govern-
ment.82 Such foreign interests typically include the sanctity of its
legal process. Many countries refuse to assist the United States in
proceedings that they consider offensive or nonexistent in their re-
spective countries. 83 For example, some foreign nations oppose pro-
viding investigative information to grand juries because they feel such
proceedings are overly intrusive.84
The primary way to insure that a foreign law or a foreign coun-
try's discretion will not affect a request for information is to establish
procedures to facilitate cooperation, often through a bilateral or mul-
tilateral treaty. 85 If a nation considers a treaty supreme over its own
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a) (1988).
75. Id. § 1781(b).
76. Professor Paikin refers to the court's inherent ability to send and respond to letters
rogatory, citing United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1971). Paikin, supra note 72,
at 254.
77. 697 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1091 (1983).
78. Id. at 178.
79. Id.
80. Paikin, supra note 72, at 255.
81. 16 O.R.2d 273 (1977) (Can.).
82. Westinghouse, 16 O.R. at 288-89. The Court found that the request was one of dis-
covery, not necessary for use at trial, and therefore not to be used in the "interest of justice."
Id. at 18.
83. Newcomb, supra note 11, at 60-61.
84. Id. at 60-62.
85. Other forms of agreement include case-specific agreements, which are treaties appli-
cable only to a certain investigation, letters of cooperation, and letters of understanding, which
are typically arrangements between nations, but are less formal than a treaty. See, e.g., New-
702 [Vol. 15:691
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laws, a treaty will serve as an effective exemption to its secrecy laws.
The treaty is a vast improvement over prior information-gathering
methods because "[t]he Treaty presents a systematic program for ju-
dicial assistance between the contracting parties."' 86 One such treaty
is the United States-Swiss Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters.8
7
IV. UNITED STATES-SWISS TREATY ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN
CRIMINAL MATTERS
A. History
Prior to 1926, the United States government depended largely
upon letters rogatory to acquire testimony from witnesses located
outside the United States.88 Subpoenas came into use in the 1920s to
compel testimony requested by a letter rogatory when a United States
citizen refused to voluntarily comply with the request. 89 In 1938, the
Department of Justice wanted to expand the extraterritorial reach of
the United States judicial system.90 The Department of Justice re-
cruited the assistance of the Harvard Law School's Research in Inter-
national Law Project to draft what became known as the Harvard
Project,91 a draft of a treaty relating to international judicial assist-
ance. In the decade that followed, United States authorities actively
pursued international cooperation in judicial matters by joining the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 92 Legislation which followed
comb, supra note 11, at 69-70; see generally Salisbury, supra note 26. In the United States, for
example, a letter of cooperation is less effective than a treaty because it does not acquire "law"
status, since it is not ratified by the Senate. See Stultz, supra note 7, at 107. Letters may attain
law status if attached to a treaty, prior to the treaty's ratification. See, e.g., Treaty, supra note
8, at 2019.
86. Johnson, supra note 36, at 351.
87. Treaty, supra note 8.
88. Congress passed various acts between 1855 and 1873 that addressed the scope of a
letter rogatory and the extent of a court's authority to use one. Congress increasingly re-
stricted the content of the request and the subject matter the letter rogatory could address
during this time. See Alan Ellis & Robert L. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters: A Comparative Analysis, 19 INT'L LAW. 189, 192 n. 17 (1985).
89. A court's authority to issue subpoenas was also limited since the subpoena only had
power over United States citizens and service occurred via consular offices abroad. See id.
90. Id. at 193.
91. Id.
92. Id. Congress later enacted legislation to facilitate its role as a signatory to the agree-
ment. The legislation provided for the transmission and receipt of letters rogatory and physi-
cal evidence. Later amendments to these laws, however, failed to provide the United States
with the ability to effectively participate in the international exchange of evidence. Id. at 193-
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J
imposed limitations on international participation 93 and these limita-
tions left the United States Department of Justice seeking more effec-
tive agreements.
The United States Department of Justice began its search for
binding arrangements in 1961, when it proposed initial discussions
with Italy concerning a bilateral treaty.94 However, no such agree-
ment materialized. The focus then shifted to piercing the veil of Swiss
banking secrecy laws when criminal prosecution in the United States
exposed the illegality fostered by such secrecy. 95 In November 1968,
federal law enforcement agencies sought cooperation from Switzer-
land on criminal matters.9 6 Five years of negotiation resulted in the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confeder-
ation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters ("Treaty"). 97 After
ratification by the United States Senate, President Gerald R. Ford
signed the Treaty on July 10, 1976.98 Switzerland ratified the Treaty
on July 7, 1976, and the Treaty entered into force on January 23,
1977.99 The Treaty also included seven interpretatory letters ex-
changed between the two governments.100
B. Strengths and Limitations of Selected Provisions in the Treaty
This Comment avoids examination of the Treaty, article by arti-
cle. Instead, this Comment focuses on aspects of the Treaty that are
directly relevant to facilitating or hindering the exchange of evidence.
Although the analysis which follows places emphasis on the effects
the Treaty has on United States prosecutors, most arguments apply
equally to Swiss authorities. Understanding the Treaty's benefits and
burdens will assist the determination of which features future treaties
93. Id.
94. Id. at 196.
95. Id. at 196-97.
96. JOHN SPARKMAN, TREATY WITH THE SWISS CONFEDERATION ON MUTUAL
ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, S. REP. No. 29, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter SPARKMAN REPORT].
97. Treaty, supra note 8, at 2019. Negotiations lasted five years because of the parties'
dispute over the treaty's applicability to tax violations. See Ellis & Pisani, supra note 88, at
197.
98. Treaty, supra note 8, at 2019. The Senate advised ratification on June 21, 1976.
99. Id.
100. Id. See TREATY WITH THE SWISS CONFEDERATION ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN
CRIMINAL MATTERS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, S. EXEC. Doc. F, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 23 (1976) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE]. The United States initiated all but one
of the seven letters. The letters explained how the United States interpreted the Treaty and
requested a notice of acceptance of that interpretation. Id. at 35-36.
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should incorporate and which features need improvement in order to
ensure cooperation.
1. Application of the Treaty
Article 1 of the Treaty outlines the matters that require both
countries' cooperation. Assistance is available for investigations and
court proceedings concerning offenses punishable in the requesting
"State."'' The negotiators insisted that the Treaty mandate assist-
ance in both the investigative and trial phases of criminal prosecu-
tion. 10 2 Further, assistance extends to federal and state grand jury
proceedings, governmental agency investigations 103 and certain ad-
ministrative actions. 104 Depending on the extent to which either
country grants assistance, foreign investigators may obtain informa-
tion just as if they entered the country and began their own investiga-
tion under a passive judicial assistance scheme. 105
The Treaty defines an offense as any act that the requesting State
has a reasonable suspicion to believe occurred which constitutes the
elements of a crime.10 6 This provision is beneficial because it allows
the United States to request Switzerland to use judicial procedures,
such as warrants, based on a less demanding level of suspicion than
the United States' requirement of probable cause. 10 7 The Treaty, in
effect, reduces the requisite level of suspicion for a warrant for inter-
national evidence gathering.
Article 2 treats tax crimes, among other offenses, separately. The
101. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 1, para. l(a). The term "State" refers to either the United
States, Switzerland, any particular states in the United States, or any canton in Switzerland.
The term "state" will be used when referring to one of the United States in general, and the
term "country" will be used when referring to either Switzerland or the United States. The
term "assistance" includes, but is not limited to, locating witnesses, taking persons' testimony
or statements, producing or preserving necessary documents, records, or articles of evidence,
serving documents, and authenticating documents. Id. para. 4(a)-(e).
102. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 35-36.
103. Id. at 36. The Department of Justice informed the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations that the Treaty was a significant step because it bound a civil law country and a
common law country and contained sections that permitted automatic admissibility of evi-
dence in United States courts. SPARKMAN REPORT, supra note 96, at 4 (statement of John
Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, before the Foreign Relations Committee).
104. See PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 37.
105. See supra notes 37-69 and accompanying text. This process saves money. Swiss au-
thorities can conduct an investigation for their United States counterpart, thus saving travel
and lodging costs. The Treaty only requires that the parties pay reasonable costs for efforts
expended while fulfilling a treaty-based assistance request. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 34.
106. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 1, para. 2.
107. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 36-37.
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Swiss adamantly opposed the inclusion of tax law violations in the
Treaty's coverage. The Swiss delegation refused to include such viola-
tions because Swiss law does not recognize such actions as criminal.10 8
Certain tax violations and government regulatory infractions, there-
fore, are not governed by the Treaty. 109
The twenty-six cantons of Switzerland 110 are free to apply federal
and cantonal law as they wish in the collection of taxes.II Tax collec-
tion authorities have chosen not to invade citizens' financial privacy,
choosing instead to rely on taxpayers' voluntary reporting.11 2 If a tax-
payer fails to file a return, Swiss law gives the authorities no other
means of acquiring this information. 11 3 This policy applies only to tax
evasion; the Swiss government looks differently upon tax fraud. Tax
fraud occurs when a taxpayer "commits overt acts, uses fraudulent
practices or falsifies documentary evidence in order to mislead tax au-
thorities."11 4 Because the cantons define crimes independent of a na-
tional scheme, a criminal act in one canton may not be considered a
criminal act in another. 1 5 Because Switzerland's national govern-
ment considers tax violations minor offenses and refuses to invade
people's privacy in financial matters, the Swiss negotiating team ex-
cluded tax violations from the Treaty, except in certain cases involv-
108. SPARKMAN REPORT, supra note 96, at 2. "Tax evasion is not considered a crime in
Switzerland and is, therefore, not included under the coverage of [the] agreement." Id.
109. Article 2, paragraph 1 states in pertinent part:
1. This Treaty shall not apply to:...
c. investigations or proceedings:...
(5) concerning violations with respect to taxes, customs duties, governmen-
tal monopoly charges or exchange control regulations other than the
offenses listed in items 26 and 30 of the Schedule to this Treaty (Sched-
ule) and the related offenses in items 34 and 35 of the Schedule.
Treaty, supra note 8, art. 2, para. 1.
Offenses excluded from this exception include gambling and trade in narcotics, injurious
substances and weapons, as well as attempts or conspiracy to commit such crimes. See id. at
2064-67 for discussion of the Schedule of Offenses.
110. "Switzerland is divided into twenty-six legally autonomous cantons, including six
half-cantons." Stultz, supra note 7, at 72 n.49 (citing VOYAME, INTRODUCTION TO SWISS
LAW 4 (F. Dessemontet & T. Ansay eds. 1983)).
111. Meyer, supra note 10, at 32.
112. Id. at 33.
113. See id. This holds especially true in regard to obtaining information from banking
institutions; banks, as third parties, have no duty to disclose such information, even upon
request from the government. Id. It should be noted that in some instances and under specific
circumstances, Swiss law requires third persons to provide information to the tax authorities.
See id. at 33 n. 94.
114. Id. at 34.
115. See id.
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ing the investigation of organized crime. 1 6 Finally, the Treaty does
not provide assistance for collateral crimes that may be committed
during the commission of a crime not covered by the Treaty.117 For
example, the Treaty allows cooperation regarding the offense of for-
gery, 1 8 but denies cooperation if the only purpose for committing for-
gery was to evade taxes. 1 9 The express limitations of Article 2
prevent overly restrictive or unintended results.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
interpreted Article 2 to allow assistance for violations of customs laws
not associated with the payment of duties.1 20 In United States v.
Johnpoll,121 the defendant was charged not only for transporting sto-
len securities, but also for failing to report the transportation of nego-
tiable instruments, 22 a customs violation. The court concluded that
"'as long as the evidence was used to prosecute violations covered by
the Treaty, the government was not precluded from also prosecuting
other related non-treaty offenses."' 23 Therefore, the court found it
permissible to use the requested evidence for a non-included (but not
prohibited) offense.
Article 3 contains one of the greatest limitations with respect to
information exchange. Paragraph 1 gives to the requested State the
right to refuse to cooperate if: (1) such cooperation "is likely to preju-
dice its sovereignty, security or similar interest" or (2) the purpose of
the request for information is to prosecute a person for an offense for
which one has already been tried in a court of the requested State.1 24
The United States negotiating team's technical analysis of the Treaty
emphasized that this considerable loophole applies only to limited
government interests.125 "[B]oth Governments also recognize that
the execution by Switzerland of a request which would require the
disclosure of information normally protected by banking secrecy is
not comprehended by the concept 'likely to prejudice its sovereignty,
116. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 2, para. 2, art. 6, para. 2(a).
117. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
118. The Treaty generally provides assistance for forgery. See id. at 2065.
119. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 39.
120. Paragraph 1 states that the "Treaty shall not apply to:... c. investigations or proce-
dures: (5) concerning violations with respect to... customs duties." Treaty, supra note 8, art.
2, para. 1.
121. 739 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1984).
122. Id. at 704.
123. Id. at 714.
124. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1.
125. See PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 39.
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security or similar essential interest.' ",126 Despite the United States'
assertion, an exchanged letter accompanying the Treaty states that
banking secrets could, in exceptional circumstances, be an "essential
interest" justifying the denial of assistance. 127 The Swiss policy for
determining whether to divulge a secret requires the balancing of the
individual's privacy interest against the requesting State's interest in
justice and need for the evidence.128 These criteria are not formulaic,
and allow the State to refuse assistance merely by claiming the indi-
vidual's interest outweighs the necessity for the evidence. 129
Article 4 prescribes the degree of action to be taken when a re-
quest is neither excluded by Article 2, nor refused under Article 3.
The parties are on notice that their criminal procedures may not be
available through the Treaty unless the requested State has a compa-
rable procedure. 130
United States courts interpret the measures available under Arti-
cle 4 to prohibit pronouncing foreign indictments upon suspects. In
In re Request from the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Po-
lice,131 United States prosecutors subpoenaed a witness, Bruno Gior-
dano, to testify for a Swiss criminal investigation. 3 2 Swiss authorities
then asked the prosecutor, as a representative of the Swiss Govern-
ment, to pronounce the Swiss indictment upon the witness when he
appeared. 13 3 The district court found that the indictment would be
similar to a United States arraignment, which Article 2 of the Treaty
did not address. 134 The court added that the Treaty did not extend
the jurisdiction of Swiss procedures to the United States,1 35 nor could
it allow the United States to compel an appearance without an arrest
warrant. 136 The following month, a New Jersey district court rejected
126. Id. at 48.
127. Id. at 28-29 (interpretive letters between Albert Weitnauer, Ambassador of Switzer-
land, and Shelby Cullom Davis, Ambassador of the United States).
128. Id. at 48. Article 10 of the Treaty addresses the right to refuse to testify concerning
matters protected by banking secrecy laws. See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
129. The Treaty provides for remedial procedures to allow cooperation before the re-
quested State refuses assistance. If possible, the requested State will provide assistance under
conditions it feels are necessary to avoid any prejudicial impact. See Treaty, supra note 8, art.
3, para. 2.
130. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 4, para. 1.
131. 731 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
132. Id. at 491.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 492.
135. Id.
136. 731 F. Supp. at 492.
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the claim that the pronouncement of a Swiss indictment was a "pro-
ceeding" which allowed the use of the compulsory measures of Arti-
cle 4.137
While Article 4 may not include the application of a requesting
State's criminal procedures, courts have interpreted it to include the
freezing of assets. In Barr v. United States Dep't of Justice, 38 the
court determined that:
[a] freeze of the assets of a criminal defendant is not specifically
mentioned in the list. However .... Switzerland's legislation im-
plementing the Treaty does authorize that measure. Thus, both
the American government (as shown by its request in this case)
and the Swiss government ... believe that such a freeze is one of
the mutual assistance measures embraced by the Treaty.' 39
Further, Article 4 imposes the rule of dual criminality upon the
offense in order to employ compulsory measures. To utilize compul-
sory measures, the acts or omissions described in the assistance re-
quest must first satisfy the elements of a criminal offense.140 Second,
the offense must not only be punishable under the requested State's
law, but also listed in the Treaty's Schedule of Offenses.14'
The Treaty provides that for unlisted offenses, a requesting State
may use compulsory measures only at the requested State's discre-
tion. 42 This provision insures that the Schedule of Offenses is not
exclusive, allowing the possibility that the requested State may offer
broader assistance.
Paragraph 4 of Article 4 requires that the requested State deter-
137. In re Request from L. Kasper-Ansermet, 132 F.R.D. 622, 633-36 (D.N.J. 1990). The
suspects to be indicted were Salvatore Giordano, Sr. and Salvatore Giordano, Jr., owners of
the company involved in the same fraudulent scheme. The court emphasized that the primary
purpose of the Treaty was in the area of cooperative evidence exchange, not participation in
judicial proceedings. Id. at 635 (evaluating the intent of Article 29 of the Treaty).
138. 819 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1987).
139. Id. at 28.
140. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 4, para. 2.
141. Id. See PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 40. Offenses deemed worthy of
compelled cooperation include: homicide, infliction of grievous bodily harm, threat of murder,
kidnapping, child abandonment, rape, trafficking in women and children, robbery, burglary,
embezzlement, extortion, certain types of fraud, bribery, forgery, perjury, bookmaking, arson,
piracy, trafficking in or possession of drugs, poisons or weapons, and attempts to commit,
conspiracy to commit, or participation in any of these acts. Treaty, supra note 8, at 2064-67.
Note, however, paragraph 2 allows for assistance in matters concerning gambling even
though in some states such acts are not criminal. This is an exception to the dual criminality
requirement. Id. art. 4, para. 2(b), 2066.
142. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 4, para. 3.
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mine if the offense described in the request constitutes a crime under
its own law. 143 The fact that the elements of a crime may be different
in one State from another does not limit the Treaty. The requested
State may ignore variations in offense definitions if the elements of a
corresponding offense, as its law defines, are present.144 Article 4 also
encourages the requested State to invoke voluntary procedures to in-
duce the production of the requested evidence, but not to punish fail-
ure to comply. 45 Assistance is advocated, but actual cooperation
depends on the requested State's disposition. The inclusion of this
voluntary assistance provision, although discretionary, further facili-
tates law enforcement.
Article 5 limits the Treaty's applicability and is the result of a
clash between the United States and Switzerland over the extent to
which each country can use exchanged information. The negotiators
settled on the Swiss scheme, which limits the use of evidence to pur-
poses related to the offense for which the requested State granted
assistance. 46 However, this restriction is ineffective when evidence
obtained for prosecution in a United States court becomes part of the
public record and is thereby available for future use. 147 In addition,
Article 5 employs a timesaving provision allowing previously obtained
evidence to be used against the same suspects for a subsequent case
when the Treaty would have required the requested State to provide
assistence or the requested State would have chosen to provide it.148
United States case law has also expanded the use of requested
information. In Meiridge, Inc. v. Heublein, 49 the court held that Ar-
ticle 5, paragraph 1, allows a bankruptcy trustee, who the Swiss con-
143. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 4, para. 4.
144. Id. For example, the federal government's definition of fraud includes only fraudu-
lent acts that involve subject matter within the jurisdiction of the federal government. PRESI-
DENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 66. In Switzerland, fraud is always a crime. Under
Article 4, the Treaty allows assistance regardless of whether Swiss law has a comparable juris-
diction-establishing element. Id.
145. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 41.
146. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 5, para. 1.
147. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 24-26 (interpretive letters between Al-
bert Weitnauer, Ambassador of Switzerland, and Shelby Cullom Davis, Ambassador of the
United States).
148. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 5, para. 2(a)-(c). A State may not, however, grant evidence
to be used in cases against accomplices upon a renewed request. For example, if the initial
evidence had been banking information of the principle offender, Switzerland would not pro-
vide the same information for the prosecution of an accomplice. Even under the tenets of
paragraph 2, Switzerland may not give its approval to the use of that evidence in the second
trial.
149. 125 B.R. 825 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991).
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sider to be a government authority, to use the Treaty to obtain a
debtor's banking information when the trustee suspects that the
debtor is violating a court order. 150 Thus, the Treaty may provide
evidence for a civil contempt charge even though the initial court in-
volvement was not criminal in nature. Furthermore, this evidence is
also available in any related bankruptcy proceedings, even those com-
menced before the court order or other circumstances giving rise to an
assistance request.
2. Organized Crime Provisions
Articles 6 through 8 specify certain conditions in which a re-
quested State will grant assistance even though the Treaty would not
have otherwise included these exceptional offenses. 15' These articles
establish that cooperation is warranted when the requested informa-
tion satisfies conditions related to the fight against organized crime.
Articles 6 through 8 are beneficial because they provide for coopera-
tion when dual criminality is non-existent, -52 and allow assistance for
tax violations when certain conditions exist. 153 The extent to which
this paragraph increases the Treaty's use is not of primary concern.
The inclusion of provisions such as the organized crime-tax evasion
exception are extremely convenient and beneficial to overall extrater-
ritorial enforcement of United States law, especially when there is in-
sufficient evidence to prosecute in the United States. 154 However, this
added usefulness is limited since the requested State has the discretion
to refuse assistance. 155
3. Obligations of the Requested State
Article 9 stipulates that a request shall be performed under the
laws of the requested State, as though the criminal committed the
offense in that jurisdiction. 56 Although this provision limits the tools
150. Id. at 827-28.
151. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 43.
152. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 7, para. 1.
153. Id. art. 7, para. 2.
154. A major requirement of Article 7 is that "the requesting State reasonably conclude
that the securing of the information or evidence is not possible without the cooperation of the
authorities in the requested State, or that it would place unreasonable burdens on the request-
ing State or a state or canton thereof." Id. art. 7, para. 3.
155. Id. art. 8, para. 2.
156. Id. art. 9, para. 1. The mere fact that the requesting State executes requests in ac-
cordance with the requested State's law does not mean that the only redress for a party injured
by the execution of the request is also under the laws of the requested State. Cardenas v.
1993]
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available to the requesting State, it insures that the requested State
remains within the bounds of its own laws.
Article 10 states that a person compelled to testify or produce
evidence for a proceeding in a requesting State must do so only in
accord with the customs of the requested State. 157 That person may
refuse to comply if he can do so lawfully in either State. 158 This provi-
sion allows a foreign witness to employ testimonial and production
excuses in proceedings not typically recognized as valid. The United
States agreed to this limitation because banking secrets did not fall
into this category. 159
Article 10 also requires that Switzerland release regularly pro-
tected banking information of parties not accused of committing a
crime if: (1) the information relates to a serious offense, (2) the infor-
mation is important to obtain or prove facts that are substantially sig-
nificant, and (3) the information is otherwise unavailable.16° This
provision was an important victory for the United States delegation
because it provides important collateral evidence upon the satisfaction
of easily fulfilled conditions. 161
4. Obligations of the Requesting State
The Swiss delegation's concern over maintaining the privacy of
bank records for persons unassociated with the commission of the
crime led to the inclusion of Article 15. It states that such informa-
tion shall be kept from public disclosure if the requested State so
desires and it is constitutionally possible. 1 62 The United States' con-
stitutional right to a public trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment 1 63 creates an anomaly. The United States Supreme Court has
Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For further discussion of the right to judicial
review see infra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
157. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 10, para. 1.
158. Id.
159. An interpretive letter between Ambassadors of the United States and Switzerland
insures that Swiss banking secrecy is not an area in which a person can claim a testimonial or
production privilege. See PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 48.
160. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 10, para. 2.
161. As stated in the United States' technical analysis of the Treaty:
Paragraph 2 strikes a balance between the interest of the United States in obtaining
broad assistance in connection with important criminal cases and the Swiss interest
in not departing from banking secrecy except where the reasons for doing so are
compelling from the point of view of international cooperation in the fight against
crime.
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 48. But see Treaty, supra note 8, art. 10, para. 3.
162. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 15.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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found an absolute right of public access to testimonial evidence, but a
court may protect documentary evidence through a protective order
upon Switzerland's request to keep the evidence private.164 Article 13
prohibits the use of witness testimony in a subsequent proceeding
against him if the court did not initially warn the witness of his right
not to testify. 165 United States prosecutors, however, can combine the
Sixth Amendment and the Treaty provision to make information at
the initial trial available at the subsequent trial.
5. Documents, Records, and Articles of Evidence
Article 16 instructs the requested State to provide court judg-
ments, documents, records, and articles of evidence in court files to
the requesting State as if it were performing the same function in its
own State.' 66 Court decisions are typically public records, 67 but the
tender of file evidence, which is not always accessible, benefits both
the United States and Switzerland in their efforts to convict using all
relevant information. However, the use of file evidence is limited in a
closed case, or when the central authority of the requested State per-
mits its disclosure. 68
For the most part, Articles 17 and 18 mitigate the uncertainty
surrounding admissibility. Article 17 requires that proferred docu-
ments be unedited, and prefers the originals. 69 Article 18 allows the
authentication of business documents without requiring the record
custodian to testify.17 0 This is advantageous to both countries because
it eliminates the need for costly in-court authentication.
164. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 52. For further explanation of the de-
fendant's right to public trial and the conflict between the United States Constitution and the
Treaty see id. at 30-32 (discussing the contents of the interpretative letters between the ambas-
sadors of each country).
165. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 13. See also PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at
51.
166. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 16, para. l(a), (b).
167. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 52.
168. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 16, para. 2.
169. Id. art. 17.
170. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 53. The Treaty closely resembles 28
U.S.C. § 1732 (1991) (Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)). The Treaty requires that the re-
quested authority determine, under oath:
[I]f [the document] is genuine and if it was made as a memorandum or record of an
act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if it was made in the regular course of business
and if it was the regular course of such business to make such document at the time
of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event recorded therein or within a reasonable
time thereafter.
Treaty, supra note 8, art. 18, para. 1.
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Article 19 establishes the authenticity of official documents by
requiring that the applicable authority attest and seal them.171 This
provision is extremely beneficial to jurisdictions that have relaxed ad-
missibility rules because it recognizes the requesting State's law as su-
perior to the formalities of the Treaty. Thus, a document may be
admissible under local rules although it did not meet the requirements
of Article 19.172
Article 20 allows a requesting State to take advantage of the pro-
cedural devices available in the requested State. If necessary for the
admissibility of evidentiary material, the requested State may use
compulsory measures to force a person's appearance before represent-
atives of the requesting State and to compel the production of evi-
dence or testimony.1 73 This provision does not demand such
measures, but permits United States officials to employ them outside
their jurisdiction. 174
6. Service for Requesting State and Related Provisions
Like Article 10,175 Article 25 grants a witness from the requested
State the right to refuse to testify or produce evidence if he has the
lawful right to do so in either the requesting or requested State.
176
The requesting State concedes the right to refuse under either States'
laws in return for the assistance the other State provides. 17 7 This pro-
vision may detrimentally impact the United States' prosecutorial ef-
forts since it gives the witness the laws of two nations behind which to
hide. The Treaty further limits the availability of evidence by al-
lowing a witness in the United States to refuse to produce evidence or
give testimony regarding a non-involved party's banking information
unless the conditions of Article 10 are met. 178 This provision pre-
cludes yet additional evidence from United States proceedings; it is,
171. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 19, para. 1.
172. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 55.
173. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 20, para. 1.
174. See PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 56; supra notes 37-69 and accompa-
nying text (passive judicial assistance discussion).
175. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
176. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 25, para. 1.
177. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 59.
178. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 25, para. 2. These conditions include: (1) the request itself
must "concern ... the investigation or prosecution of a serious offense;" (2) the disclosure is
important "for obtaining or proving facts" that are greatly needed; (3) the United States has
made "reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to obtain the evidence or information in other
ways." Id. art. 10, para. 2(a)-(c).
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however, consistent with Article 10. Furthermore, the United States
may not appropriate evidence that the Swiss government may sup-
press. Article 25 also requires that the requested State inform the
requesting State whether the witness has validly asserted his right to
refuse in the requesting State. 79 The only redeeming feature of this
provision is that the requesting State has the last word. After consid-
ering the requested State's opinion on the claimed privilege, the re-
questing State may make its own determination on whether the
conditions of Article 10 are met. 80
7. General Procedures
Articles 28 through 35 establish the procedures each country
must follow when requesting assistance. Article 28 provides that the
central authority of the requesting State approve and forward requests
generated by the courts and other authorities under its control.' 8 '
Although this provision provides for consistent application, the added
procedural step of endorsement may prevent a state or canton from
having the requested State consider its request.8 2
Article 31 requires the requested State to inform the requesting
State when it believes that the request does not comply with the
Treaty. 8 3 The authority or court required to execute the request
must exercise all powers available to it when executing the request.18 4
As a result, United States investigators wield the power of Swiss au-
thority, while Swiss investigators may employ United States
authority. 8 5
In 1990, a federal district court attempted to define the term "all
powers available." In In re Request from L. Kasper-Ansermet,I8 6 the
179. Id. art. 25, para. 3.
180. Id.
181. Id. art. 28, para. 2.
182. Negotiators qualified this requirement, claiming the approval process merely insures
that the request has proper form and content. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 60.
The central authority, however, also may prioritize which requests get sent. Id.
183. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 31, para. 1. Unfortunately, the provision does not mandate
preserving the evidence requested, while awaiting a corrected request. PRESIDENTIAL
MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 61.
184. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 31, para. 2. This power includes the issuance of procedural
documents compelling the production of evidence and giving of testimony. See id art. 31,
para. 3.
185. The Treaty expressly provides Switzerland with the use of grand juries in the United
States. Id. art. 31, para. 2. The Treaty also allows the requested State, with the requesting
State's consent, to commission private parties to execute a request. Id. art. 31, para. 4.
186. 132 F.R.D. 622 (D.N.J. 1990).
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defendants argued that the use of a civil subpoena to compel testi-
mony for a criminal proceeding was impermissible under the Treaty,
and that the prosecutor needed an analogous criminal summons. 187
The court held that although a prosecutor may request a grand jury
subpoena, Article 31 allows courts to use their authority to compel
testimony, and a civil subpoena is the court's procedural method for
doing so.188
8. Notice and Review of Determinations
Notice requirements of the requested State are set out in Article
36. When executing a request, the requested State is required to no-
tify: (a) any person from whom the requesting State seeks testimony
or evidence, (b) any criminal suspect or defendant of the investigation
living in that State (but only if the requesting State's laws require no-
tice for admissibility and the requesting State asks for such notice),
and (c) any defendant in a criminal proceeding in the requesting State
if the requested State's law requires it.189 The underlying purpose of
this provision is to provide a suspect or defendant in a United States
criminal proceeding the opportunity to be present at the Swiss admis-
sibility hearing, in order to satisfy United States' constitutional re-
quirements.1 90 Although in the United States, the defendant may
assert his constitutional right to be present,1 91 the admissibility of evi-
dence does not turn on his presence. 192 Therefore, the failure to sat-
isfy (b) is never fatal.
When authenticating a business document under Article 18, Ar-
ticle 36(c) does not necessarily require either State to notify the de-
fendant or suspect that it is gathering such information. 93
Apparently, the defendant or suspect must discover this on his own.
However, the only way a suspect could anticipate the authentication
hearing is if the requesting State already asked him for the informa-
tion and he refused, or the custodian of the documents warned him
187. Id. at 626.
188. Id. at 627.
189. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 36.
190. See PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 63. This policy of limited redress
also applies to suspected violations of Article 5. If a party believes that the prosecution used
validly obtained evidence for an additional purpose, such as a different investigation or pro-
ceeding, that person would not have the right to the typical forms of judicial relief. Id. at 43.
191. See id. at 55.
192. See id.
193. See Treaty, supra note 8, art. 36.
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that the information was requested. 194 In United States v. Davis,195
the defendant argued that the United States court erroneously admit-
ted certain evidence because the government failed to inform him of
the Swiss authentication hearing and thus violated his Sixth Amend-
ment right to confrontation. 196 The court found that the United
States was neither explicitly nor implicitly required to notify the de-
fendant. 197 The court concluded that under the Treaty only Switzer-
land may be required to notify him of the Swiss authentication
proceeding. 98 The court determined that the gap in the notice re-
quirement was specifically erected by the negotiators to "simplify and
expedite the procedures for obtaining information." 99
Article 37 establishes important limitations on the right of a
party seeking redress under the Treaty. Paragraph 1, with limited
exceptions, prohibits a party from suppressing or excluding evidence,
or obtaining judicial relief in the United States by asserting restric-
tions expressed in the Treaty.200 This provision makes the Treaty ap-
pealable pursuant to its own terms. "Enforcement of the provisions of
the Treaty is a matter for the Contracting Parties and does not give
rise to any right on the part of defendants, subjects, witnesses or other
persons to obtain judicial relief except as specifically provided
therein."' 20 This condition speeds prosecution and limits the ability
to appeal judgments, except in instances when a court may have in-
fringed upon a substantial procedural right.
This limited right of appeal has been litigated frequently, but un-
194. In Barr v. United States Dep't of Justice, 819 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1987), one of the
defendant's Swiss banks notified him of the query made on behalf of the United States shortly
after the request, and the defendant retained counsel to contest the freezing of his account.
Unfortunately, his appeal was rejected by the Swiss courts. Id. at 26.
195. 767 F.2d 1025 (2d. Cir. 1985).
196. Id. at 1027.
197. Id. at 1030.
198. Id. at 1031. See also Treaty, supra note 8, art. 36.
199. United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d at 1031.
200. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 37. para. 1. Paragraph 1 allows an injured party, however,
to raise rights granted under other areas of the Treaty. These areas include:
(a) Searches and Seizure (Article 9:2); (b) privileges in connection with requested
testimony (Article 10:1); (c) restrictions on use of testimony (Article 13); (d) rights to
question the genuineness of documents furnished pursuant to the Treaty (Article
18:7); (e) limitations on compelling testimony in the requesting State (Article 25:1);
(f) limitations in the Treaty on the transfer of persons (Article 26); and (g) provisions
in the Treaty on safe conduct of witnesses (Article 27) ....
Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 9, 10, 13, 18, 25, 26, 27. See also PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra
note 100, at 63-64.
201. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 63.
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successfully. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held in Cardenas v. Smith,20 2 Article 37 may "indeed short-
circuit any claims Cardenas makes that stem from the Treaty. It does
not follow that the Treaty, as a superior law of the land, precludes any
actions premised on the Constitution or other statute. ' 203 The court
reasoned that Cardenas may not have had a valid claim, but the dis-
trict court had overstepped the limits of the Treaty when it claimed
the Treaty prevented her from raising defenses unrelated to the
Treaty. Since Cardenas v. Smith, United States courts have repeat-
edly held that an alleged injured party may not demand judicial re-
view of either parties' error in application or execution of a Treaty
provision. 204 As stated below, the injured party must seek redress
from the other signatory.
Paragraph 2 of Article 37 establishes that the decisions of Swiss
authorities concerning requests for evidence shall be governed by
Swiss law.20 5 Paragraph 3 provides a remedy to the person who be-
lieves a State failed to comply with the Treaty. That person may
demonstrate to the central authority of one State the suspected breach
by the other State, and the notified State may take steps to resolve the
difficulty.206 This appeal process is an injured party's only remedy to
infringements that paragraph 1 does not except. Such a route is bene-
ficial to prosecution and investigative authorities because the appeals
process is handled by an entirely different body that has no authority
to halt their investigation. Yet for the very same reason, this means of
appeal is disadvantageous to the injured party.
202. 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
203. Id. at 918.
204. See United States v. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702, 714 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1025 (1985) (stating that Article 37 expressly bars the suppression or exclusion of the type of
evidence furnished in the case); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1029 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating defendant had no standing to raise the purported Treaty violation before the court);
Barr v. United States Dep't of Justice, 645 F. Supp. 235, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 819 F.2d
25 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating Article 37 affords no right to private persons to obtain judicial relief
except as to matters not relevant to that proceeding); Melridge, Inc. v. Heublein, 125 B.R. 825,
828 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991) (stating that defendant lacked standing to assert violations of the
Treaty).
205. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 37, para. 1. In Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984), the court noted that it was aware that Cardenas had filed suit in Switzerland to prevent
the forfeiture of her bank account contents to the Swiss government. Id. at 912. In Barr, Barr
filed an objection and an appeal to the Swiss authorities concerning the freezing of his funds.
Barr, 819 F.2d at 26.




Article 38 declares that the Treaty does not detract from proce-
dures available under other treaties or laws of the contracting
States.20 7 The States are still at liberty to use their own laws to con-
duct investigations and criminal proceedings. 20 8 However, the Treaty
supercedes inconsistent local law.2°9 These provisions mean that the
Treaty procedures are wholly in addition to pre-existing evidence
gathering methods. In In re Sealed Case No. 87-5256,210 the court
rejected the witness's argument that the Treaty provides the exclusive
method for obtaining records maintained in or generated in Switzer-
land and, therefore, obtaining documents by subpoena was invalid.21'
The court discounted that claim by explaining that according to such
reasoning, investigators using traditional domestic methods could
never obtain copies of Swiss documents which are located in a defend-
ant's home in the United States.
212
Article 39 establishes guidelines for consultation and arbitration.
The central authorities may correspond with each other as necessary
concerning interpretation and use of the Treaty.213 Parties are to refer
disputes that are unresolved by mutual agreement of the parties, to
arbitration 214 presided by a three person board.215 This provision,
although not unique, 2 16 provides for a system of dispute resolution
independent of either State's law and is dedicated to the Treaty's
terms. Furthermore, decisions of the arbitration board are binding on
the parties. 21 7 As a result, comity is likely because, instead of termi-
nating relations when a disagreement arises, the parties understand
that by agreeing to this provision both have agreed to work out the
dispute and continue mutual assistance.
207. Id. art. 38, para. 1.
208. Id. art. 38, para. 2.
209. Id. art. 38, para. 3. Furthermore, this Treaty does not encompass the type of infor-
mation contemplated under the Treaty on the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to
Taxes on Income. Id. art. 38, para. 4.
210. 832 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
211. Id. at 1283.
212. Id.
213. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 39, para. 1.
214. Id. art. 39, para. 2.
215. Id. art. 39, para. 2. By granting authority to the president of the International Court
of Justice to select the members of the arbitration board, the Treaty resolves potential board
selection conflicts. See id. art. 39, paras. 3, 4.
216. "Such provisions are common in technical agreements or treaties .... PRESIDEN-
TIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 65.
217. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 39, para. 7.
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Article 40 defines the terms used throughout the Treaty. The
only term worthy of mention is "articles of evidence," which is de-
fined as all evidence whether admissible or not.
21 8
Although the above discussion is not a complete analysis of each
article of the Treaty, the coverage given does address issues of pri-
mary concern in evidence gathering. This Treaty, although twenty
years old, serves as a template for future mutual assistance treaties
because no treaty since has so meticulously considered so many as-
pects of international cooperation in criminal matters.
V. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES IN THE CARIBBEAN
A. Background
The Swiss Treaty was not the only treaty the United States was
compelled to negotiate. In effect, the presence of the Swiss Treaty
forced criminals to different bank secrecy countries, and thus, created
a need for other mutual assistance treaties.
The development of Caribbean nations into financial centers was
facilitated, in part, by the financial secrecy offered to their bank cus-
tomers. This led the United States to negotiate a series of agreements
seeking judicial assistance in criminal matters. 219 These efforts began
in the early 1980s and are not yet complete. The State Department
obtained an agreement from the United Kingdom and the govern-
ment of the Cayman Islands to assist the United States in its fight
against drug trafficking. 220 Interestingly, although the Cayman Is-
lands government has agreed to assist the United States, the United
States has no reciprocal obligation .2 2  In consideration for its unilat-
eral assistance, however, the Cayman Islands' government received a
promise from the United States that the agreement would be the ex-
clusive mechanism by which the United States could obtain evidence
located in the Cayman Islands. 222
218. Id. art. 40, para. 3. For the entire list, see id. para. 1-10.
219. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands, S. REP. No. 8,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Report on Cayman Islands].
220. Agreement Concerning Obtaining Evidence from the Cayman Islands with regard to
Narcotics Activities, July 26, 1984, U.K.-U.S., 24 I.L.M. 1110 [hereinafter Cayman Islands
Agreement].
221. See id. § 1.
222. Id. § 6; Report on Cayman Islands, supra note 219, at 3. This Agreement's applica-
bility was extended to include Turks and Caicos Islands on September 18, 1986, Anguilla on
March 1, 1987, the British Virgin Islands on April 14, 1987, and Montserrat on May 14, 1987.
Agreement Extending the Agreement of July 26, 1984, concerning the Cayman Islands and
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The Cayman Island Agreement was to serve as a prelude to a
more formal treaty. Initially, however, the Cayman government used
the Agreement to prevent further progress. Section 7 of the Agree-
ment binds the United States, the United Kingdom and the Cayman
Islands to negotiate a law enforcement treaty.223 However, section 10
allows the Agreement to be extended beyond its stated expiration
date.224 Although the nations did negotiate the Treaty Concerning
the Cayman Islands and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters225
("Cayman Islands Treaty"), the Cayman Islands government took
nearly five years to ratify it,226 most likely because it favored the terms
in the Agreement over those of the Treaty.
B. Analysis of the Cayman Islands Agreement and Treaty
Although the Treaty has entered into force, examining the
Agreement as well as the Treaty reveals issues all negotiators and
drafters of mutual assistance treaties should strongly consider.
1. The Cayman Islands Agreement
Improving on its Swiss counterpart, the Cayman Islands Agree-
ment broadly defined covered offenses. Section 2 required assistance
on "all offences or ancillary civil or administrative proceedings taken
by the United States Government or its agencies connected with, aris-
ing from, related to, or resulting from any narcotics activity" covered
Narcotics Activities, Feb. 27, 1990, U.K.-U.S., Hein's No. KAV 2912 (hereinafter Extension
Agreement].
223. Cayman Islands Agreement, supra note 220, § 7.
224. Id. § 10.
225. Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
July 3, 1986, U.K.-U.S., 26 I.L.M. 536 (1987) [hereinafter Cayman Islands Treaty]. Anguilla,
the British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands agreed to extend the Treaty's applica-
bility to their territories on November 9, 1990. Agreement Extending the Applicability of the
Treaty of July 3, 1986, concerning the Cayman Islands relating to mutual assistance in crimi-
nal matters, to Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands, Nov. 9,
1990, U.K.-U.S., Hein's No. KAV 2762. On April 26, 1991, Montserrat agreed to extend the
Treaty's applicability to its territory. Agreement Extending the Applicability of the Treaty of
July 3, 1986, concerning the Cayman Islands relating to mutual assistance in criminal matters,
to Montserrat, Apr. 26, 1991, U.K.-U.S., Hein's No. KAV 2880.
226. The United States Senate advised and consented to ratification of the Cayman Islands
Treaty on January 3, 1989. Report on Cayman Islands, supra note 219, at 51. As of February
27, 1990, the Cayman Islands had not ratified its treaty. Extension Agreement, supra note
222. A State Department letter to the President, dated September 26, 1991, refers to the Cay-
man Islands Treaty as "in force." Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
July 7, 1989, Jam.-U.S., S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. III (1989) [hereinafter
Jamaica Treaty].
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by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961.227 Not only did
this language include offenses related to drug offenses, but a require-
ment of dual criminality was nonexistent. Therefore, practically any
crime for which a United States prosecutor requested evidence fell
under the Agreement.
Compliance with a Cayman Islands order to produce evidence
was ensured by section 3.2.b. Refusal to produce documentary infor-
mation rendered the requested party liable to substantial fine and im-
prisonment.228 Furthermore, officials could seize the requested
evidence229 and make it available to the prosecution.
Section 6 significantly hindered evidence collection. It prohib-
ited the use of federal subpoenas by the United States to obtain evi-
dence otherwise covered under the Agreement and located in the
Cayman Islands, without the consent of the United Kingdom or the
Cayman Islands.230 This provision basically killed the subpoena
power of the federal courts relied on in cases such as In re Bank of
Nova Scotia. It is no wonder the Cayman Islands government contin-
ued to extend this Agreement and stall ratification of the more expan-
sive treaty.
2. The Cayman Islands Treaty
As stated above, the Cayman Islands government eventually rati-
fied the Cayman Islands Treaty and ceased using the Cayman Island
Agreement. The Cayman Islands Treaty is a prime example of good
intentions never realized. The United States' use of the subpoena
power caused the Cayman Islands to tighten its banking secrecy laws
and to discourage unauthorized disclosures.231 Negotiations failed to
relax the Cayman Islands government's stance or facilitate judicial
interaction. Many of the provisions in the Cayman Islands Treaty are
more restrictive than those of the Swiss Treaty.
232
Article 3 of the Cayman Islands Treaty permits authorities to
deny assistance if they certify that the request is contrary to the public
interest of the State. 233 The requested State exercises its own discre-
227. Cayman Islands Agreement, supra note 220, § 2. The Single Convention of Narcotic
Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1409.
228. Id. § 3.2.b.
229. Id.
230. Id. § 6.
231. Report on Cayman Islands, supra note 219, at 3.
232. Id. at 1.
233. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 225, art. 3, para. 1.
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tion, and no criteria are provided to aid the determination of what is
contrary to public interest. A redeeming provision asserts that a State
may provide assistance subject to conditions which permit it while
avoiding the feared harm.
234
Article 7 of the Cayman Islands Treaty prohibits the subsequent
use of information supplied by a State. Although the Swiss Treaty
negotiators assumed free use of information made public, 235 the Cay-
man Islands Treaty expressly limits subsequent use of evidence to a
confined group of situations.
236
The United States took another step backward when it agreed to
Article 14 of the Cayman Islands Treaty. Instead of establishing a
requisite level of suspicion for taking foreign action,237 as is done in
the Swiss Treaty, the United States submits to the Cayman Islands'
reasonable suspicion requirement. 2
38
Article 17 is another provision that has hindered United States'
efforts to obtain evidence. The United States agreed that the Cayman
Islands Treaty would be the first method for obtaining foreign evi-
dence. 239 This provision, however, stops short of the earlier Agree-
ment by allowing alternative means of evidence gathering after a
party has first attempted to acquire the information under the
Treaty. 240 Nonetheless, requiring prosecutors to initially comply with
the formalities of the Cayman Islands Treaty is an impediment to
swift and effective law enforcement.
The provisions of the Cayman Islands Treaty are not entirely
weaker than those of the Swiss Treaty. Under Article 16, either State
may notify the other State of the presence of criminal offense proceeds
located in its territory. 241 This, coupled with the express forms of
assistance available listed under Article 1, effectively codifies the au-
thority to freeze the assets of a criminal enterprise. 242 These provi-
sions prevent defendants from contesting freezing actions similar to
234. Id. art. 3, para. 4.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 162-65.
236. See Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 225, art. 7, para. 4. Furthermore, informa-
tion furnished must be kept confidential. Id. art. 7, para. 2.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
238. See Treaty with the United Kingdom Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Message from the President, S. TREATY Doc. No. 8,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. VIII (1987).
239. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 225, art. 17.
240. Id.
241. Id. art. 16, para. 1.
242. Id. art. 1, para. 2(g).
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Barr v. United States Dep't of Justice.243
3. Other Tax Haven Country Treaties
The United States has recently concluded two other treaties with
Caribbean nations. The United States and the Bahamas signed the
Treaty with the Bahamas on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters244 ("Bahamas Treaty") on August 18, 1987, and on July 7, 1989,
the United States and Jamaica signed the Treaty with Jamaica on Mu-
tual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters245 ("Jamaica Treaty").
United States Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, respec-
tively, told the Senate, upon request for ratification, that the treaties
would serve as valuable tools in the battle against drug cartels and
white collar crime.246
The Bahamas Treaty imposes the requirement of dual criminality
when it defines offenses worthy of assistance, but relaxes the require-
ment for certain felonies.247 Also, the Bahamas Treaty expressly pro-
vides for the freezing of assets related to narcotic offenses.248 The
standard discretionary loophole for requests contrary to a State's pub-
lic interest is modified by allowing conditional assistance. 249 Much
like the Cayman Islands Treaty, information admitted into evidence
in a public proceeding is available for subsequent use only if certain
conditions exist.250 The final two provisions represent the only signifi-
cant advances that the Bahamas Treaty makes over the Swiss Treaty.
Either State may inform the other if it becomes aware of criminal
proceeds present in its jurisdiction. 251 Also, United States negotiators
did not repeat the problem of the Cayman Islands in that the Baha-
mas Treaty is not the exclusive means of obtaining assistance.252
The Jamaica Treaty's major improvement over prior agreements
is its abandonment of dual criminality. "Assistance shall be rendered
... under the laws of the Requesting State and regardless of whether
243. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
244. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Aug. 18, 1987, U.S.-Bah., S.
TREATY Doc. No. 17, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 [hereinafter Bahamas Treaty].
245. Jamaica Treaty, supra note 226.
246. See Bahamas Treaty, supra note 244, at III; Jamaica Treaty, supra note 226, at III.
247. Bahamas Treaty, supra note 244, art. 2.
248. Id. art. 20. The Bahamas Treaty further provides assistance in hearings which could
result in the forfeiture of drug proceeds and instrumentalities. Id. art. 2, para. 3(c).
249. See id. art. 3.
250. See id. art. 8.
251. Id. art. 14.
252. Id. art. 18.
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... prohibited under the laws of the Requested State .... ,253 How-
ever, like the Cayman Islands and Bahamas Treaties, the discretion-
ary denial provision includes a conditional assistance option.254 The
State Department negotiators finally received unlimited and un-
restricted use of treaty evidence made public.255 Finally, like the Ba-
hamas Treaty, the Jamaica Treaty provides for assistance in locating
and seizing the proceeds of crime,256 and its provisions are not the
exclusive means for obtaining foreign evidence.257
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Cooperation between the United States and its treaty partners
can be improved if the countries fully embrace the treaty terms. Any
resultant improvements also may benefit future mutual assistance
agreements with other nations. Many of the changes that benefit the
United States are little more than concessions attained in negotiations.
These improvements, such as unlimited use of testimony in subse-
quent proceedings, removing the requirement of dual criminality, al-
lowing the subsequent use of evidence made public or expanding the
list of included offenses, are provisions that successful negotiators
may procure. This Comment has familiarized the reader with the
strengths and weaknesses of the various treaty provisions. Obtaining
every substantive edge possible must be a primary negotiation objec-
tive. Therefore, negotiators must focus on mechanisms that will en-
sure they reach this objective.
A. Mechanisms in Negotiating
To enhance the probability of reaching a favorable agreement, a
country may approach negotiations in a variety of ways. One method
that may prove successful requires that a party direct its efforts to-
ward the achievement of a very specific goal. For instance, the United
States entered into negotiations with Switzerland with the express de-
253. Jamaica Treaty, supra note 226, art. 1, para. 3.
254. Id. art. 2.
255. Id. art. 8, para. 4. Inclusion of such a provision goes one step further than the under-
standing between the United States and Switzerland concerning public records. The Swiss
Treaty allowed subsequent use if the now public information was usable in the requested State.
Treaty, supra note 8, art. 5. The Jamaica Treaty allows use regardless of the requested State's
policy on use of public information. Jamaica Treaty, supra note 226, art. 8, para. 4. See PRESI-
DENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 100, at 24-26.
256. Jamaica Treaty, supra note 226, art. 20.
257. Id. art. 19.
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sire of prosecuting organized crime figures. 258 Although Switzerland
refused to include general tax offenses in the Treaty, the United
States' persistence to secure an agreement to hamper organized crime
resulted in the adoption of Articles 6 through 8, which require assist-
ance in such matters.
259
Another way a country can insure that it obtains the terms it
desires in an international agreement is to enhance its negotiating lev-
erage by using its economic power. The United States holds a com-
manding position in the international economic community, and
flexing its economic muscle often forces negotiating partners to con-
cede to otherwise unwelcome demands. Negotiators must remember,
however, that no party is required to continue negotiations and high-
pressure tactics may not only end the discussions, but may weaken or
terminate existing cooperation. Measures the United States can em-
ploy include refusing economic or humanitarian aid, turning world
public opinion against uncooperative nations, 26° or sanctioning unco-
operative nations.
2 6T
Furthermore, the United States government can indirectly influ-
ence cooperation by employing domestic measures that dissuade for-
eign intercourse. Money launderers often obtain "clean" money by
obtaining loans from foreign banks, and securing the loans with the
"dirty" money. By creating a rebuttable presumption that all loans
from identified tax or bank security havens are backed by a taxpayer's
own funds, the Internal Revenue Service could treat the loan as taxa-
ble income. 262 Discouraging investment in foreign nations that de-
258. The Cayman Islands Treaty focused on narcotic trafficking. See generally Cayman
Islands Treaty, supra note 225.
259. See Meyer, supra note 10, at 64 (briefly discussing the differing interests between the
United States and Switzerland regarding the scope of their Treaty).
260. Bernhard Meyer suggests that should a country inflexibly protect secrecy, even in
extreme cases of criminal conduct, other countries may condemn that country's policy, result-
ing in harm to that country's international reputation. Id. at 80.
261. Because United States companies comprise much of a bank's business and Swiss
banks desire that business, the United States government can threaten to prohibit Swiss banks
from doing business in the United States in retaliation for Switzerland's failure to cooperate.
Finn & Pouschine, supra note 33, at 43.
The Senate Subcommittee on Governmental Affairs has suggested sanctioning tax haven
countries that choose not to negotiate mutual assistance treaties with the United States. RE-
PORT ON OFFSHORE BANKS, supra note 1, at 139. The tools available as leverage include: (1)
requiring that taxpayers report loans from those countries as income for income tax purposes,
(2) denying as tax deductions losses and expenses arising out of transactions in or with those
countries, (3) requiring that United States' banks report all transactions with that country, and
(4) limiting or restricting direct airline flights to and from those countries. Id.
262. Meyer, supra note 10, at 79.
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pend on United States' business may persuade uncooperative nations
to accede to cooperation agreements.
Finally, the United States can entice cooperation by suggesting
that these countries instigate their own forfeiture laws, similar to
those in the United States. The United States-Swiss Treaty recognizes
that a cooperating party should be entitled to benefit from the fruits of
its labor. That is, once a State supplied information sufficient to con-
vict, proceeds from the offender's crime may become the property of
the assisting nation.263 Furthermore, seizure is advantageous because
it is in the best interest of all parties to prevent the commission of
future crimes. 264
B. Procedural Improvements
In addition to focusing on the attainment of specific crime fight-
ing objectives, negotiators of future United States criminal assistance
agreements should seek detailed procedural improvements over ex-
isting treaties. Additional treaty provisions will improve cooperation,
extend applicability and strengthen enforcement. Prosecutorial ef-
forts would benefit from the streamlining of investigative action re-
quirements. Limiting the conditions necessary to obtain a warrant or
compel testimony to the least restrictive country's laws would benefit
the nation that ordinarily must comply with a higher standard within
its own boundaries. However, the nation with the lower standard
would not receive any benefit from such a provision. A provision
more beneficial to each is one that establishes thresholds of suspicion
independent of the law of either country. Such a provision may be
unworkable, however, since no jurisdiction would have policy or pre-
cedent upon which to base its decisions to grant or deny compulsory
measures.
To address the absence of a tribunal to determine independent
policies and procedures, the contracting nations could mandate the
formation of a multinational board, similar to the dispute-settling
board provided in Article 39 of the United States-Swiss Treaty.265
Board membership could consist of representatives from all signatory
nations and perhaps competently informed persons not associated
263. Paikin, supra note 72, at 266-67. Of course, authorities would return proceeds that
are the property of a victim of a crime. Id. The Caribbean Island treaties provide for such
forfeiture assistance. See Bahamas Treaty, supra note 244, art. 14; Jamaica Treaty, supra note
226, art. 20; Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 225, art. 16.
264. See supra note 9.
265. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
19931 727
Loy. L.A. Int7 & Comp. L.J.
with the signatory nations. For example, the tribunal could decide
when compulsory measures must be provided. However, because of
the degree of individual involvement, such a provision would only be
effective in a limited number of circumstances.
A multinational tribunal could address whether a party's deci-
sion not to cooperate on discretionary grounds is valid. As the Swiss
Treaty now reads, either State can refuse to assist in the production of
evidence if it feels such cooperation would prejudice its sovereignty or
security interests.266 In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions remarked that one of the Swiss Treaty's two flaws is that the
Swiss have the discretion whether to allow the use of information they
provide. 267 Here, an independent board could render a decision after
balancing the necessity for the requested information against the rea-
son for refusal to determine whether a nation's position is justified
under its own law. The tribunal's decision is one in which the re-
questing State can place more faith.
This multinational tribunal could also have an appellate review
function which would determine violations alleged by persons injured
by the treaty. The appellate review provision could require that if it
determines the existence of a violation the State acquiring the ill-got-
ten information must either supress that evidence or compensate the
injured party. In addition, the tribunal board, independent of the cen-
tral authorities of any party, could review requests for assistance and
make a preliminary determination of whether assistance must be
granted. Some sovereigns, however, may find this role unacceptable
since it would not require its courts to comply with an international
tribunal's command to issue compulsory process. Obviously, a
United States court will not issue a search warrant because a commit-
tee, not directly entrusted with the preservation of constitutional
rights, requests it. Furthermore, with or without a tribunal, a sover-
eign nation may choose to deny assistance under a treaty.
The furthest courts appear willing to extend immunity from local
court policy is the provision in the Swiss Treaty limiting appeals to
the requested State.268 Prohibiting an appeal of a Swiss decision to
cooperate automatically renders any evidence released to United
States authorities admissible if it meets local evidentiary require-
ments. However, courts have placed one substantial barrier between
266. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
267. Report on Cayman Islands, supra note 219, at 1.
268. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
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a completed request and admissibility. In Cardenas v. Smith, the
court determined that the Swiss Treaty did not prevent review of con-
stitutional violations.269 Thus, the courts must review possible Fourth
and Fifth Amendment transgressions committed by Swiss authorities
in the process of seizing assets to determine if Switzerland has in-
fringed a defendant's rights.
Perhaps the most effective means of insuring that a requesting
nation has the best opportunity to obtain requested evidence is to al-
low the requesting State to solicit the compulsory order from the for-
eign court directly rather than through a central authority. A
provision which allows United States authorities to request a Swiss
court to compel Swiss authorities to execute an order that the United
States court believes is justifiable provides the United States with its
best chance to secure the evidence it needs but cannot reach under its
domestic laws. In effect, such a provision is comparable to a compul-
sory letter rogatory because assistance is obligatory under a treaty.
VII. CONCLUSION
Common sense and a desire to bring criminals to justice has de-
manded that the internationalization of crime be combatted with the
concomitant internationalization of crime fighting. The United States
has responded by attempting to obtain evidence necessary to prose-
cute offenders by any method possible. In an effort to pacify nations
which disapproved of foreign investigation and compulsion within its
borders, the United States relied on its own evidence gathering tech-
niques. However, consensual cooperation by offenders and statutorily
imposed reporting requirements often proved ineffective in providing
vital evidence necessary for many convictions. Although subpoenas
extended the long arm of United States law, they confined prosecutors
to the jurisdiction of the Court issuing the subpoena. Bank secrecy
laws in foreign countries presented a barrier few United States courts
could breach.
United States authorities realized that the only way to circum-
vent these obstacles was to take advantage of a foreign authorities'
ability to obtain information that it could not. The letter rogatory
proved invaluable for bridging the international evidence gap. How-
ever, the United States sought more reliable and regular cooperation
and developed mutual agreements. The Treaty Between the United
269. 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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States and the Confederation of Switzerland on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters has demonstrated that consistent cooperation is at-
tainable. Although the Swiss Treaty has successfully supplied both
nations with invaluable criminal evidence, its limitations clouded its
ability to supply investigators and prosecutors with information indis-
pensable in the ferreting out and conviction of criminals.
Because criminal enterprise is always at least one step ahead of
enforcement and since criminal schemes constantly evolve, a treaty
that accounts for all situations on one day may be useless the next.
Therefore, nations must supplement and improve old treaties and
draft new treaties to keep pace with both international and domestic
criminal enterprise. Nations such as the United States, wishing to
include controversial or disputed provisions in international agree-
ments, must emphasize specific goals and exert social, political or eco-
nomic leverage when negotiating. These countries must also focus on
substantive matters in the negotiating process. Agreeing on provi-
sions that expand either nations' investigatory reach while insuring
admissibility and limiting exclusion and appeal appear to be the most
successful methods for insuring that evidence necessary for prosecu-
tion can be obtained and successfully used against the accused.
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